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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 Daniel Jensen appeals from his judgment of conviction for poisoning food, 
medicine, or wells.  Jensen specifically challenges the district court’s denials of his 
motion to declare the automatic waiver provision of I.C. § 20-509 unconstitutional, and 
his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
 
 According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the facts underlying 
Jensen’s criminal conduct are as follows: 
On November 28, 2014, Sgt. West was dispatched to 916 Bobcat Drive in 
the City of Jerome for a report of poisoning. At the residence, Sgt. West 
met with Jamie Novak. She reported her son was possibly trying to poison 
her. Novak said she had seen green flakes in her coffee for the past few 
days and had started getting headaches recently which she said she 
never usually got. Novak reported that about a week and a half prior, her 
son, Daniel Jensen, stole some things from their garage. She advised she 
found them in his room along with a case that contained a green 
substance inside a black bag. Novak said she believed the green 
substance was soap. Novak stated she confronted Jensen about the 
missing items. 
 
Novak reported when she made coffee today; [sic] she observed green 
flakes in it. She advised Jensen had returned home around 10:30 a.m. 
after spending time at his father’s house. Novak said she and Jensen 
watched a movie, drank coffee, and hung out a bit during the afternoon. 
She stated Jensen’s friend, Caleb Dumitry, wanted Jensen to go 
somewhere with him, but that she said he could not. Novak reported she 
told Jensen that Dumitry was not [sic] longer allowed at her residence 
after he mouthed off to her which then caused an argument between her 
and Jensen about Jensen not having any friends. Novak stated Jensen 
then began choking a cat and said he was going to kill it. She said Jensen 
then stood up, looked at her, and said, “If I were you I wouldn’t drink 
anymore coffee” before going to his bedroom. 
 
Novak stated that was when it dawned on her that the substance she 
found in Jensen’s bedroom was the same substance she had seen in her 
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coffee. She said she retrieved the black bag containing the substance 
from Jensen’s room and determined it was rat poison. Novak reported 
when she entered Jensen’s bedroom, he punched two holes in the wall 
and told her to stay out of his room. Novak advised she, her boyfriend 
identified as Jason Knapp, and 11 year old son [M.L.] all consumed the 
poisoned coffee. 
 
Sgt. West next spoke to Jensen about the incident. Jensen stated he was 
tired of life and admitted to drinking the poisoned coffee. He admitted to 
putting the poison in the coffee he obtained from a mouse trap a couple of 
days prior. Jensen said he put the poison in the coffee because his mother 
is always holding him down and not letting him go anywhere. Jensen 
denied he was trying to kill his mother. He was arrested and transported to 
the Snake River Juvenile Detention Center. 
 
(PSI, p.3.)  On December 1, 2014, while Jensen was still incarcerated, Deputy Kirk 
Thorpe interviewed him for about 40 minutes at the Snake River Detention Center – 
after Jensen was given, and agreed to waive, his Miranda1 rights.  (See generally St. 
Ex. 3; Supp. Tr., p.18, L.22 – p.19, L.16; p.21, L.22 – p.24, L.12.)  During his interview, 
Jensen admitted that he placed poison in his mother’s coffee in an attempt to kill (or “get 
rid of”) her.  (See generally St. Ex. 3.)  
 Jensen was charged with attempted first degree murder for placing rat poison in 
his mother’s coffee,2 two counts of aggravated battery (for doing the same to [M.L.] and 
Jason Knapp), and two misdemeanors: malicious injury to property, and possession of 
tobacco by a minor. (R., pp. 9-11.)  The Amended Criminal Complaint invoked I.C. § 20-
509, which automatically waives minors between the ages of 14 and 18 into adult court 
for certain enumerated crimes.  (Id.)  Prior to the preliminary hearing, Jenson’s 
appointed counsel filed a “Motion to Declare I.C. §§ 20-508, 509 Unconstitutional and 
                                                          
1  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 
2  A Second Amended Complaint was later filed alleging the same crimes, but clarifying 
that it was “mice” poison, not rat poison, that Jensen placed in the three victims’ coffee.  
(R., pp.90-92.)  
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for Order Remanding Case to Juvenile Court,” which included a supporting legal 
analysis.  (R., pp.44-82.)        
 After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate court dismissed the two aggravated 
battery charges for lack of probable cause (R., pp.102-103), and bound Jensen over to 
district court for attempted murder in the first degree (R., pp.105-106).  The state filed a 
response to Jensen’s motion to declare I.C. §§ 20-508 and 20-509 unconstitutional.  
(R., pp.125-132.)  On January 22, 2015, the district court entered a memorandum 
decision and order denying Jensen’s motion to declare the two waiver statutes 
unconstitutional.  (R., pp.133-138.)  Jensen filed a “Motion to Suppress and Brief in 
Support,” seeking to suppress statements he made to law enforcement both before and 
after his arrest, and the state filed a response.  (R., pp.142-146, 151-156.)  Despite 
having ruled on Jensen’s motion to declare the waiver statutes unconstitutional, a 
hearing on that motion was combined with a hearing on his suppression motion, and 
held on March 31, 2015.  (R., pp.157-161.)  After the hearing, the court entered a 
memorandum decision denying Jensen’s motion to suppress (R., pp.164-175), and an 
order denying his motion to declare I.C. §§ 20-508 and 20-509 unconstitutional (R., 
pp.161-163).       
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jensen entered a conditional plea to an amended 
charge of (felony) Poisoning Food, Medicine, or Wells (I.C. § 18-5501), reserving his 
right to appeal from the district court’s denial of his two motions, and the state dismissed 
the misdemeanors.  (R., pp.179-182, 196; 5/6/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-20.)  The state agreed 
to recommend a “blended” sentence of five years with two years fixed, and to have 
Jensen committed to the Department of Juvenile Corrections (“DJC”); Jensen could ask 
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for a withheld judgment and the state would recommend a five-year period of 
supervised probation.  (5/6/15 Tr., p.4, L.18 – p.5, L.13.)  The district court ordered 
Jensen to have a mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 to assist it in 
sentencing.  (R., p.184.)   
 In its Amended Judgment of Conviction, the district court determined that a 
blended sentence was necessary because adult sentencing measures would be 
inappropriate given Jensen’s “maturity level,” and conversely, juvenile sentencing 
options were not appropriate due to the seriousness of the offense.  (R., p.201.)  The 
court (a) sentenced Jensen to the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction for a 
unified five-year term with two years fixed, and (b) suspended imposition of the 
underlying sentence and retained jurisdiction, committing Jensen “to the dual custody of 
the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (DJC) and the Idaho Department of 
Correction (IDOC) in accordance with I.C. § 19-2601A.”  (R., p.201.)  The court further 
stated in its Amended Judgment of Conviction that it “intends to re-sentence the 
defendant as an adult after the commitment to the DJC and the Court determines that 
the defendant has received all that can be offered for rehabilitation within the juvenile 
justice system or until no later that [sic] age twenty-one (21).”  (R., p.201.)  Jensen filed 





ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
 Jensen phrases the issues as follows: 
 
1. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Jensen’s motion to declare 
automatic waiver provision of a juvenile into adult court 
unconstitutional? 
 
2. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Jensen’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
 (Appellant's Brief, p.4 (verbatim).) 
 The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
 
1.  Has Jensen failed to establish that the automatic waiver provision of I.C. § 20-509 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment or violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause? 
 







Jensen Has Failed To Establish That The Automatic Waiver Provision Of I.C. § 20-509 
Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment Under The Eighth Amendment Or Violates 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
 
A. Introduction 
 Idaho Code § 20-509(1), which is part of the Juvenile Corrections Act, provides 
that any person between the ages of 14 years and 18 years who commits certain 
enumerated violent offenses “shall be charged, arrested and proceeded against by 
complaint, indictment or information as an adult.”  One of these enumerated offenses is 
attempted murder.  I.C. § 20-509(1)(a).  Jensen argues that the automatic waiver 
provision of I.C. § 20-509 violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel 
and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  (See 
generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-29.)  Jensen’s arguments fail because (1) the 
automatic waiver provision does not constitute “punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment, and (2) under the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not involve a liberty 
interest and passes the rational scrutiny test for due process. 
 
 
B. Standard of Review 
 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate 
court exercises free review.  Doe I v. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 1040, 1050 
(2003).   
 
C. The Automatic Waiver Provision Of I.C. § 20-509 Does Not Constitute Cruel And 
Unusual Punishment Under The Eighth Amendment 
 
 In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for children.  Next, in Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48 (2010), the Court ruled the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life 
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without the possibility of parole for a child who committed a non-homicide offense.  In 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012), the Court ruled that mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.  Additionally, 
Jensen cites Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), which held 
that Miller must be applied retroactively.  Relying on these cases, Jensen argues that 
Idaho’s automatic waiver provision, I.C. § 20-509, inflicts cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment3 because it “subjects juveniles to excessive sanctions by 
treating them as adults without accounting for their diminished culpability and individual 
characteristics.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-8.)  Jensen’s argument fails.   
 Instead of citing viable legal authority to support his contention that Idaho’s (or 
any other state’s) automatic waiver provision constitutes “punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment, Jensen bases his argument on his “youth matters” theme, gleaned from 
Roper, Graham, and Miller.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-14.)  However, those cases – 
dealing with the maximum juvenile punishments of death and (subsequently) life without 
                                                          
 
3 As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517, 
164 P.3d 790, 797 (2007): 
 When reviewing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment the Court 
uses a proportionality analysis limited to cases which are “out of 
proportion to the gravity of the offense committed.”  State v. Brown, 121 
Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992).  The Court compares the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence 
is grossly disproportionate.  State v. Robertson, 130 Idaho 287, 289, 939 
P.2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 1997). This gross disproportionality test is 
equivalent to the standard under the Idaho Constitution which focuses on 
whether the punishment is so out of proportion to the gravity of the offense 
to shock the conscience of reasonable people.  Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 
825 P.2d at 491.  An “intra-and inter-jurisdictional” analysis is “appropriate 
only in the rare case” where the sentence is grossly disproportionate to 
the crime committed.  State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851 P.2d 
336, 340 (1993).   
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the possibility of parole – are unique to their sobering sentencing issues and irrelevant 
to the “automatic waiver” issue at hand.  As the district court held, Jensen’s “reliance 
upon [Roper, Graham, and Miller] is misplaced since the defendant is not subject to 
either the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole.”  (R., p.162.)  Inasmuch 
as Jensen has presented no authority that actually supports his argument that I.C. § 20-
509 constitutes “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment, this Court should decline to 
consider the issue.4  See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered.”).    
 There is ample authority establishing that the automatic waiver provision of I.C. § 
20-509(1) does not constitute “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.  The United 
States Supreme Court has stated that the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, “prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishments on those convicted of crimes.”  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296–97 
(1991) (emphasis added). That is, the Eighth Amendment only comes into play after 
there has been a formal adjudication of guilt, through a criminal prosecution, in 
accordance with due process of law.  See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General 
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).  Similarly, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 
(1979), the United States Supreme Court explained: 
                                                          
4  Jensen appears to argue that by being automatically waived into adult court, he was 
“punished” because, as a result of that placement, he was later subjected to adult 
sentencing.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-14.)  However, he has failed to present any 
authority to support the argument that the mere automatic waiver into adult court, prior 
to conviction, constitutes “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.  See Zichko, 129 
Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 
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The Court of Appeals properly relied on the Due Process Clause rather 
than the Eighth Amendment in considering the claims of pretrial detainees. 
Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A 
sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that 
punishment may not be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. 
The Court recognized this distinction in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 
671-672, n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412-1413 n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977): 
 
“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the 
State has complied with the constitutional guarantees 
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. See 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317-318, 66 S.Ct. 
1073, 1079-1080, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946). . . . [T]he State 
does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth 
Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal 
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. 
Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such 
an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”[5] 
 
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment applies only to punishments imposed after ‘a formal adjudication of guilt in 
accordance with due process of law.’”).  In short, the authorities are in agreement that 
                                                          
5  In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1977), the Supreme Court explained: 
 
In light of this history, it is not surprising to find that every decision of this 
Court considering whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” within the 
meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a 
criminal punishment.  [Citing line of cases.]   
 
These decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause circumscribes the criminal process in three ways: First, it limits the 
kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, . . 
. ; second, it proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime . . . . ; and third, it imposes substantive limits on what 
can be made criminal and punished as such . . . . We have recognized the 
last limitation as one to be applied sparingly. “The primary purpose of (the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause) has always been considered, 
and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment 
imposed for the violation of criminal statutes . . ..”  
 
(Quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-532 (1968) (plurality opinion)). 
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the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment provision applies only to 
persons who have been convicted of a crime.  When Jensen was automatically waived 
into adult court, he had not been convicted, therefore, he was not “punished” for Eighth 
Amendment purposes. 
   Jensen lastly argues that “the statute allows the district court to impose an adult 
penalty on a juvenile without considering the juvenile’s youth and attendant 
characteristics.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)  If by “adult penalty” Jensen is referring to the 
automatic waiver provision of I.C. § 20-509, he wrongly equates the two, as previously 
discussed.   
 However, if Jensen is suggesting the district court was permitted to “sentence” 
him without considering his “youth and attendant characteristics[,]” he is incorrect, and 
has presented no authority to support such a notion.  Indeed, prior to sentencing, the 
district court ordered Jensen to have a mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 to 
assist it in its sentencing determination (R., p.184), and at sentencing, the court ordered 
a “blended” sentence partly because it concluded adult sentencing measures were 
inappropriate given Jensen’s “maturity level” (R., p.201).  The court sentenced Jensen 
to the custody of IDOC for a unified five-year term, all suspended, and retained 
jurisdiction while committing Jensen “to the dual custody” of DJC and the IDOC under 
I.C. § 19-2601A.  (R., p.201.)  The court said it intended “to re-sentence [Jensen] as an 
adult after the commitment to the DJC and the Court determines that the defendant has 
received all that can be offered for rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system or 
until no later that [sic] age twenty-one (21).”  (R., p.201 (emphasis added).)  See State 
v. Pauls, 140 Idaho 742, 101 P.3d 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (explaining the three sentencing 
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options under I.C. § 20-509 – adult, juvenile, or blended)).   Any claim that the district 
court was permitted to sentence Jensen without considering his “youth and attendant 
characteristics” would be entirely misplaced. 
 In short, Jensen’s argument fails because, having not been found guilty of any 
criminal act when he was automatically waived into adult court pursuant to I.C. § 20-
509, he was not “punished” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 
against cruel and unusual punishment.  See U.S. v. David H., 29 F.3d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“The mandatory transfer provision of § 5032 does not prohibit or sanction 
conduct.  It merely establishes a basis for district court jurisdiction of prosecutions to 
which it applies.”).  Jensen has failed to show that the automatic waiver provision of I.C. 
§ 20-509 even implicated the Eighth Amendment, much less violated it. 
  
D. The Automatic Waiver Provision Of I.C. § 20-509 Does Not Violate The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
 
 Jensen next contends that the automatic waiver provision of I.C. § 20-509 
violates his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.14-19.)  Jensen’s due process argument has no merit.  
 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  The concept of substantive due process has been understood 
to embody the requirement that a statute bear a reasonable relationship to a 
permissible legislative objective.  State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 
(Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted).    
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In order for the state to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state 
action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must not be arbitrary, capricious, 
or without a rational basis.  Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 
(1986).  Conversely, a substantive due process violation will not be found if the state 
action “bear[s] a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective.” In re 
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 911, 918 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Reed, 107 
Idaho at 167, 686 P.2d at 847). 
“Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ suspect 
classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome only by a ‘clear 
showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.’”  Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 
1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994).  Moreover, “in a substantive due process challenge, [the 
courts] do not require that the [government’s] legislative acts actually advance its stated 
purposes, but instead look to whether ‘the governmental body could have had no 
legitimate reason for its decision.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  Additionally, “[i]f it is ‘at least 
fairly debatable’ that the [government’s] conduct is rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest, there has been no violation of substantive due process.”  
Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Kawaoka, 17 
F.3d at 1234). 
 Jensen’s “due process” argument has been rejected by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, which has repeatedly ruled that Idaho’s statutory automatic waiver provision is 
constitutional, the seminal case being State v. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454, 700 P.2d 76 
(Ct. App. 1985). “The rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow controlling precedent 
unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
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unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice.”  State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 789, 331 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 
2014) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted).  None of the arguments advanced 
by Jensen support overturning Anderson and its progeny.    
 In Anderson, the defendant was a juvenile who had participated with four other 
juveniles in the beating death of another youth.  The Court of Appeals specifically held 
that Idaho Code § 16-1806A, the former automatic waiver provision (now I.C. § 20-509), 
did not infringe the constitutional right to due process, explaining: 
Anderson’s conduct was excepted from YRA jurisdiction at its occurrence; 
he had no statutory right to be proceeded against as a minor.  Anderson 
acquired no expectation, from either legislation or state conduct furthering 
prosecution of the crime that he would be charged in juvenile court.  
Accordingly his right to due process was not infringed when he was 
charged with a crime excluded from YRA jurisdiction. 
 
 Anderson also argues that section 16-1806A violates the due 
process clause by creating an irrebutable presumption regarding his ability 
to be rehabilitated.  . . .  Anderson believes section 16-1806A, by 
excepting his conduct from YRA jurisdiction, in effect creates an 
irrebutable presumption that he cannot be rehabilitated.  He argues that 
such a presumption, by foreclosing his opportunity to demonstrate a 
rehabilitative character, infringes upon rights guaranteed by the due 
process clause.  We are not persuaded.  The cases cited by Anderson . . . 
. do not support his proposition.  . . .  As we have already discussed, 
Anderson never was entitled in this case to the advantaged position 
granted to those within the purview of the YRA.  A demonstration by 
Anderson that he can be rehabilitated would not entitle him to a YRA 
proceeding.  We find no infringement of the rights accorded Anderson 
under the due process clause. 
 
Anderson, 108 Idaho at 457-458, 700 P.2d at 79-80 (emphasis added).   
 As in Anderson, Jensen “never was entitled . . . to the advantaged position 
granted to those within the purview of the [Juvenile Corrections Act],” therefore, there 
was “no infringement of the rights accorded [Jensen] under the due process clause.”  Id.     
See State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 582 n.5, 990 P.2d 742, 748 n.5 (Ct. App. 1999) 
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(“It should be observed that the State was not required to obtain a waiver of juvenile 
court jurisdiction before proceeding in adult court on the attempted first degree murder 
charge.”); State v. McKeown, 108 Idaho 452, 453, 700 P.2d 74, 75 (Ct. App. 1985) (“We 
also hold that McKeown did not have a right under the YRA to be proceeded against as 
a juvenile.”).  Based on the fact that Jensen was never entitled to be charged or tried as 
a juvenile, he never had a liberty interest in being placed in the juvenile court system; 
therefore, his due process rights could not have been violated by his automatic waiver 
into adult court under I.C. § 20-509.   
 The Court of Appeals in Anderson also held that (former) Idaho Code § 16-
1806A did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
treating minors who commit certain violent criminal acts differently, since the  
“classification created by the legislature bears a rational relationship to an important 
legislative objective.”  Id. at 458, 700 P.2d at 80.  The Court reasonably explained, “We 
believe that, by enacting I.C. § 16-1806A, the legislature clearly intended certain violent 
criminal acts, when committed by minors, should be excluded from YRA jurisdiction.”  
Id. at 457, 700 P.2d at 79.  The Court applied these same holdings in two companion 
cases to Anderson, McKeown, 108 Idaho 452, 700 P.2d 74, and State v. Matthews, 108 
Idaho 453, 700 P.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1985), and later in State v. Juhasz, 124 Idaho 851, 
853, 865 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Espinoza, 127 Idaho 194, 898 P.2d 
1105 (Ct. App. 1995).   
 Jensen advances a similar argument that he presented in regard to his Eighth 
Amendment claim – that Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, supra, have 
transformed the law to “warrant[] the reexamination of the constitutionality of I.C. § 20-
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509 under the due process clause.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.15.)  Jensen contends that 
“Roper, Graham, and Miller establish that juveniles have a liberty interest in not being 
treated automatically as adults in the criminal justice system[,]” citing a law review 
article to support his claim.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  Because the Roper line of cases 
specifically dealt with the constitutionality of sentences involving the death penalty and 
life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed by juveniles, they are irrelevant 
to determining whether Idaho’s automatic waiver provision violates due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  More specifically, Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery 
do not support Jensen’s bare assertion that he had a liberty interest in being charged 
and tried as a juvenile.  That those cases found “youth” to be an important factor in 
deciding whether sentences of death and (later) life without the possibility of parole for 
juveniles are unconstitutional does nothing to show that Jensen had a liberty interest in 
being charged and tried in juvenile court.  Apart from the general truism that “youth 
matters” – which can be applied to any legal issue involving juveniles – Jensen has not 
explained specifically how the four U.S. Supreme Court cases support his claim that he 
had liberty interest in being tried as a juvenile.  (See R., p.162 (district court order 
stating that Jensen’s reliance on Roper, Graham, and Miller “is misplaced since the 
defendant is not subject to either the death penalty or life without the possibility of 
parole”)); see Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.3d at 970.  Jensen’s argument should 
therefore be rejected.     
 Finally, Jensen argues that, even if he had no “liberty interest in JCA jurisdiction, 
I.C. § 20-509 still violates the due process clause under the rational basis test.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18.)  Jenson argues that the “legislature’s purpose was to subject 
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certain juveniles to harsh adult penalties . . . with the prevailing penological goal likely 
being incapacitation [sic] to protect society from these alleged violent offenders.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.18 (citation omitted).)  But, the goal of protecting society is 
obviously a valid one, and accomplishing that by keeping violent offenders separated for 
a period of time by incarceration (not “incapacitation”) is a rational way of obtaining that 
goal.  It is a matter of common sense that the more serious and violent offenders should 
face more serious consequences in order to protect society.  Despite Jensen’s 
argument, the Idaho Legislature’s intent to exclude juveniles who commit “certain” 
violent crimes (see I.C. § 20-509(1)) from the Juvenile Corrections Act “bear[s] a 
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective.”  In re McNeely, 119 Idaho 
at 189, 804 P.2d at 918 (citing Reed, 107 Idaho at 167, 686 P.2d at 847.)  Jensen has 
therefore failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to declare I.C. 
§ 20-509 unconstitutional on due process grounds.  
 
II. 
Jensen Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Denial Of 
His Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction  
 
 On November 28, 2014, after Jensen’s mother, Jamie Novak, reported to law 
enforcement that she thought Jensen may have tried to poison her coffee, Deputy 
Mathew West and Deputy Chad Kingsland drove separately to Novak’s home, where 
Deputy West questioned Jensen about his mother’s report, without giving Jensen 
Miranda warnings.  (Prelim. Tr., p.7, L.15 – p.8, L.11; Supp. Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.11, L.21.)  
Deputy West discussed the incident with Jensen while Jensen stood on the front porch 
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of the residence with a friend, and after Jamie Novak went into the house with Deputy 
Kingsland following an exchange of words she had with Jensen.  (Supp. Tr., p.7, L.19 – 
p.16, L.17.)   Deputy West arrested Jensen after he made several admissions during 
the questioning on the porch that lasted about 10 to 12 minutes.  (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.23-
25; PSI, p.3.)  On December 1, 2014, while Jensen was still incarcerated, Deputy Kirk 
Thorpe interviewed him for about 40 minutes at the Sheriff’s office after Jensen was 
given, and agreed to waive, his Miranda rights.  (See generally St. Ex. 3.)   During that 
interview, Jensen admitted that he placed rat poison in the coffee container in an 
attempt to get rid of his mother.  (Id.)  
 Jensen filed a motion to suppress both sets of statements to law enforcement 
(R., pp.142-146), and, after a hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding 
that, contrary to Jensen’s arguments, (1) “Jenson was not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda while he was being questioned by Sgt. West[,]” (R., p.172), and (2) “the 
evidence presented by the State clearly indicates that [Jensen] understood his Miranda 
rights and that he made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights 
when he agreed to speak with Deputy Thorpe” (R., p.174).   
 On appeal, Jensen again argues “he was subject to ‘custodial interrogation’ 
during the first questioning and his Miranda waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent during the second questioning.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.19-20.)  Jensen has 
failed to show any error in the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.  For its 
response, and in addition to the analysis that follows, the state relies upon the district 
court’s Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (R., pp.164-175), 
incorporated by reference herein, and attached as Appendix A.   
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.  State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 
840, 186 P.3d 696 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 
P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).   
 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined That Jensen Was Not In Custody When 
He Made Incriminating Statements To Deputy West  
 
The district court held that Jensen’s statements to Deputy West on November 28, 
2014, were made when Jensen was not in custody for purposes of Miranda; therefore, 
Miranda warnings were not required to be given to Jensen in order for those statements 
to be admissible at trial.  (R., pp.170-172 (Appendix A, pp.7-9).)  Jensen has failed to 
show any error in the district court’s ruling. 
“The requirement for Miranda warnings is triggered by custodial interrogation.”  
State v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 407, 336 P.3d 809, 814 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. 
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992)).  “The United 
States Supreme Court equated custody with a person being deprived of his or her 
freedom by the authorities in any significant way.”  Id. at 408, 336 P.3d at 815 (citing 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)). “This test has evolved to define custody 
as a situation where a person’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated 
with formal arrest.”  Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. 
Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610, 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990)).  “The initial 
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determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, 
not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person 
being questioned.”  Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)).  To 
determine whether a suspect is in custody, “the only relevant inquiry is how a 
reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his or her situation.”  
Id.  (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (1984); Myers, 118 Idaho at 611, 798 P.2d at 
456). 
“A court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”  
Id. (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322; State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 
1169, 1172 (2010)).  The Idaho Court of Appeals laid out possible factors to be 
considered:  
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the 
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in 
handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than 
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other 
individuals were present, the number of questions asked, the duration of 
the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of 
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the 
conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. 
 
Id. (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-442; James, 148 Idaho at 577-578, 225 P.3d at 
1172-1173).  “The burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude 
evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings.” Id. (citing James, 148 
Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d at 1172).   
Here, the district court properly considered all of the “circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation” and concluded that Jensen was not in custody when he spoke to 
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Deputy West.  (See R., pp.164-166, 170-172 (Appendix A, pp.1-4, 7-9).)  The court 
explained [with bracketed references to the record]: 
 At the time of the encounter with Sgt. West, Jensen was on the 
front porch of his residence and got out of his chair to speak with Sgt. 
West; Sgt. West did not require he remain seated.  [Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.17-
22; p.10, Ls.1-5; p.15, Ls.5-11.]  Also during this encounter Jensen was 
with his friend Caleb Dumitry, who was standing alongside him.  [Supp. 
Tr., p.7, Ls.19-22; p. 10, Ls.6-8; p.11, Ls.11-15.]  By all accounts the 
conversation was calm and casual and Jensen was in a familiar 
environment.  [Supp. Tr., p.12, Ls.5-11; p.15, Ls.9-12.]  Jensen was not in 
any way physically restrained nor did Sgt. West say or do anything that 
would have suggested he was not free to leave.  [Supp. Tr., p.11, L.23 – 
p.12, L.4; p.15, Ls.13-23.]  This conversation only lasted approximately 10 
minutes and was of a short duration.  [Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.22-25.]  While two 
officers arrived at the residence, they parked on the street without the use 
of their overheads [Supp. Tr., p.12, L.24 – p. 13, L.11], and it appears that 
only one officer was actually present during the questioning of Jensen, 
since Kingsland had gone into the residence with Jensen’s mother [Supp. 
Tr., p.12, Ls.12-17; p.16, Ls.13-21].  
 
 By all accounts Jensen was not in custody for purposes of Miranda 
while he was being questioned by Sgt. West.  Therefore, the defendant’s 
motion to suppress his statements to Sgt. West is DENIED. 
 
(R., pp.171-172 (Appendix A, pp.8-9).)  In sum, based on the testimony before it at the 
suppression hearing, the district court found that Deputy West did not verbally or 
physically restrict Jensen’s movements in any way:  the questioning of Jensen was calm 
and casual, with a friend present, and for only a short time; the questioning took place in 
Jensen’s own environment (the porch of his home); and the deputies made no show of 
force (such as emergency lights) when they arrived.    
 In challenging the district court’s finding that he was not in custody for the 
purposes of Miranda, Jensen contends that due to his age and other circumstances, “it 
is reasonable to conclude that [he] felt ‘pressured to submit’ even if a ‘reasonable adult 
would feel free to go.’”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.24.)  Jensen cites the following 
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circumstances: (1) his “status as a juvenile[,]” (2) he was “questioned without a parent 
or other adult present[,]” (3) Deputy West testified that “Mr. Jensen was not free to 
leave[,]” and (4) Jensen could not go inside his home to avoid questioning because 
“another officer was inside with his mother – and he could not leave the porch.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.24.)  Closer examination of those factors do not show that a 
reasonable person in Jensen’s position would have understood that his freedom of 
action was “curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.”  Beck, 157 Idaho at 
407, 336 P.3d at 814 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440).  
 Although Jensen was a juvenile, he was an older juvenile at age 171/2 when he 
was questioned by Deputy West on November 28, 2014.  (St. Ex. 3, 5:20-5:35; see PSI, 
p.2 (d/o/b of 5/13/97).  Rather than being involuntarily separated from his mother and 
left alone during the questioning, Jensen’s friend, Caleb Dumitry, stood with him on the 
porch during questioning, and even became involved in the conversation between 
Deputy West and Jensen.  (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.7-18.)  The reason Jensen was 
questioned by Deputy West is because Jensen had reportedly just tried to kill his 
mother by putting rat poison in her coffee.  Jensen’s complaint that he was deprived of 
his mother’s presence while being questioned about how he had just tried to 
permanently deprive himself of her presence is specious.  In addition, the reason 
Jensen’s mother went into the house was because she and Jensen exchanged words 
on the porch when the deputies arrived – perhaps having something to do with Jensen 
lacing her coffee with rat poison.6  Deputy West testified that he would have prevented 
                                                          
6  Deputy West testified that he did not remember what started the argument between 
Ms. Novak and her son, Jensen.  (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.11-16.) 
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Jensen from leaving, but he (as the district court fairly inferred from his testimony) did 
not say or do anything to suggest that Jensen he was not free to leave (R., p.171; Supp. 
Tr., p.11, L.23 – p.12, L.4; p.15, L.13-23), and there is no indication he told Jensen to 
remain on the porch or to not enter the house (see generally Supp. Tr., pp.5-17).  
Regardless, the deputy’s subjective views are not relevant to whether Jensen was in 
custody.  See Myers, 118 Idaho at 610, 798 P.2d at 455 (custody is not determined by 
“the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being 
questioned”).   
 Even if Deputy West had temporarily “seized” Jensen for questioning pursuant to 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Jensen’s statements in that setting do not require 
Miranda warnings to be admissible at trial.  The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically 
rejected this argument, holding that the “temporary and relatively non-threatening 
detention involved in a . . . Terry stop . . . does not constitute Miranda custody.”7  
Maryland v. Shatzer, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010). 
 For the above reasons, including those set forth in the district court’s 
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Jensen has failed to show 
any error in the court’s determination that, “[b]y all accounts Jensen was not in custody 
for purposes of Miranda while he was being questioned by Sgt. West.”  (R., p.172 
(Appendix A, p.9).)   
 
                                                          
7  According to Terry, a seizure occurs “when the officer by means of physical force or 




D. The District Court Correctly Determined That Jensen Understood His Miranda 
Rights And Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Waived Those Rights When 
He Was Questioned By Deputy Thorpe  
 
 The district court denied Jensen’s motion to suppress statements he made while 
in custody to Deputy Thorpe on December 1, 2014, ruling that Jensen “understood his 
Miranda rights and that he made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his 
Miranda rights when he agreed to speak with Deputy Thorpe.”  (R., p.174.)  On appeal, 
Jensen contends that “the waiver of his Miranda rights were [sic] involuntary under the 
circumstances[,]” arguing that, as a juvenile, he was generally “less mature and 
responsible than adults,” he had no parent present at the interview, his parents were not 
informed about the interview in advance, Jensen was not told he could speak with his 
parents, Jensen showed he did not “understand the severity of the situation” by asking 
Deputy Thorpe about where he could be released, and since he had previously made 
statements to Deputy West, he did not “appreciate the consequences of providing 
additional statements to the police.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.27-28.)  Jensen’s arguments 
fail. 
 With the addition of several points of consideration, the state fully relies upon the 
district court’s factual rendition and well-reasoned analysis set forth in its Memorandum 
Decision Re: Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (R., pp.164-175 (Appendix A, pp.1-12)), 
as if fully set forth herein, for its response to Jensen’s argument.    
 According to State’s Exhibit 3, Jensen’s interview with Deputy Thorpe lasted just 
under 40 minutes, not one hour as the deputy estimated at the suppression hearing – 
not a period of time that would be considered onerous regardless.  (See Supp. Tr., p.20, 
Ls.1-3; St. Ex. 3.)  In regard to Jensen’s youthful immaturity, as previously discussed, 
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he was 17½ years old at the time of the interview – almost an adult.  As the district court 
explained, the failure of a parent to be present for the interview, although “perhaps a 
factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances . . . does not by itself render 
the waiver invalid.”  (R., p.173 (Appendix A, p.10).)  Coupled with the fact that Jensen 
was almost an adult at the time of the interview, the absence of a parent is less of a 
factor than if Jensen were younger.  Also, as the victim of Jensen’s crime, it would have 
not only been awkward for his mother to be present at the interview, but may (arguably) 
have been viewed as a way to exert parental pressure on Jensen to make further 
admissions.  
 Jenson’s question to Deputy Thorpe about where he would live if released was 
logical, given that his attempt to poison his mother with rat poison probably precluded 
him from returning to her home.  Lastly, Jensen’s “cat-out-of-the-bag” argument -- that 
once he made admissions to Deputy West, he was more susceptible to making further 
admissions to Deputy Thorpe -- is irrelevant to whether Jensen waived his Miranda 
rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.    
 Based on the district court’s well-reasoned analysis in its Memorandum Decision 
Re: Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (R., pp.164-174 (Appendix A)), and the above 
additional points, Jensen has failed to show any error in the court’s determination that 
Jensen understood his Miranda rights and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived them prior to his interview with Deputy Thorpe on December 1, 2014.  
Accordingly, Jensen has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s decisions 
denying Jensen’s motion to declare I.C. § 20-509 unconstitutional, and motion to 
suppress, and affirm his judgment of conviction and sentence.  
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2016.         
                                                        
     
_/s/ John C. McKinney_ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
On ivlarch 31, 2015 the Defendant's iV1otion to Suppress his statements to law 
enforcement came on regularly for hearing. The State was represented by Paul R. Kroger, 
Jerome County Deputy Prosecutm and the defendant was present and represented by Stacey 
DePew, Jerome County Public Dei'cndcr. 
The Court having considered the testimony, exhibits admitted into evidence, bric[, and 
arguments of counsel, took the matter under advisement for a written decision. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCl,DURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 28, 2014 Jerome County Sheri frs deputies responded lo the residence of 
Jamie Novak (Novak) for an alleged allempted poisoning of Novak by her son, Daniel E. Jensen 
I - MUv10Ri\NDlJM DECISION IU·:: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SlJl'l'RESS 164 of 227 
0 
(Jensen). Sgt. Matthew West and Deputy Chad Kingsland responded to the residence. When they 
arrived Jensen and Caleb Dumitry were sitting on the front porch of the residence and Novak 
was in the doorway of the residence. Sgt. West engaged Jensen in a conversation concerning the 
alleged poisoning of his mother. Sometime later Jensen was arrested and was transported to the 
Snake River Detention Center (SRDC) because he was a juvenile of the age of 17. 
On December I, 2014 Jensen was interviewed at the SRDC by Deputy Kirk Thorpe who 
at the time was assigned to the investigative division of the Sheriff's Office. Deputy Thorpe 
reviewed with Jensen his Miranda Rights and Jensen acknowledged and signed a Miranda 
Rights form and agreed to speak with Deputy Thorpe. 
Jensen was ultimately charged various crimes, including Attempted Murder in the First 
Degree, a felony, and was bound over to District Court after a preliminary hearing. On March 13, 
20 l 5 the defendant filed a Motion to Suppress his statement to law enforcement contending that 
his statements made to Sgt. West were made without an advisement of his Miranda Rights and 
that his statements to Deputy Thorpe were made without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
Miranda Rights. 
II. 
TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS 
MATTHEW WEST: 
Sgt. Matthew West is a Jerome County Sheriff's Office Patrol Supervisor. On November 
28, 2014 he was dispatched to 916 Bobcat Dr., Jerome in reference to a poisoning. Sgt. West had 
phone contact with Novak, the reporting party and Jensen's mother, for several minutes prior to 
his arrival during which time Novak informed Sgt.West that Jensen, a minor of 17-years-of-age, 
was currently at the home and that she thought he had attempted to poison her by placing green 
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flakes in her coffee. Sgt. West testified that he had the impression that Novak wanted him to 
speak to Jensen regarding the incident though he never specifically received express permission 
from Novak to speak with Jensen. 
Sgt. West and Deputy Kingsland dispatched in separate vehicles to the 916 Bobcat 
residence. Upon arrival both officers parked their vehicles on the street near the residence but 
neither had their overhead lights activated. Both offices approached the home at approximately 
the same time and made contact with Novak (standing in the front doorway), Jensen (seated on 
the porch to the left/ West of the front door), and Jensen's friend, Caleb Dumitry (also seated on 
the porch to Jensen's left). 
Sgt. West then introduced himself and stated they he wanted to talk to Jenson. Shortly 
after his arrival Novak and Jensen began arguing. Sgt. West could not recall what prompted the 
argument or the exact nature of the disagreement; however he did testify that words were 
exchanged and Deputy Kingsland escorted Novak inside the home where they remained in an 
effort to keep things from escalating the already tense situation. Once Novak and Kingsland were 
inside, Sgt. West began asking Jensen questions about putting rat poison in his mother's coffee, 
if he had consumed any of the coffee, and whether he intended to cause harm to his mother. At 
some point Dumitry also involved himself in the conversation. Sgt. West testified that the tenor 
of conversation was causal and respectful and that during the l 0-12 minutes of questioning 
Jensen and Dumitry both stood up on the porch approximately 4-5 feet away from him. Jensen 
did not appear nervous and did not move around during the contact. 
Sgt. West testified that despite the casual nature of the conversation he would not have let 
Jensen leave ifhe had attempted to do so. Despite Sgt. West's subjective intention of detaining 
Jensen for investigatory purposes, he never advised Jensen of his Miranda rights or his right to 
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have a parent present during questioning because "he was merely investigating a report" and 
Jensen was not in cuffs or otherwise physically detained, and Jensen never asked if he was free 
to leave or stated that he did not want to talk to law enforcement. 
KIRK THORPE: 
Deputy Kirk Thorpe is a Jerome County Sheriffs Office Patrol Officer, though at the 
time of this incident he was working with the investigations division and was the officer directed 
to interview Daniel Jensen the morning of Monday, December 1, 2014 at the Snake River 
Detention Center following his arrest on Friday, November 28, 2014. 
Deputy Thorpe testified that the interview took place in a room next to the control center. 
Only he and the defendant were in the room and the defendant (though in detention clothing) was 
not physically restrained and appeared very calm under the circumstances. Deputy Thorpe made 
an audio recording of the one (I) hour interview and testified that he believed that the interview 
room also contained security cameras which recorded video--though he was unable to confirm 
whether the cameras recorded audio and video. 
At the very beginning of the interview Deputy Thorpe introduced himself as a law 
enforcement officer, determined that Jensen was 17-years-old and could read, write, and 
understand English. He then advised Jensen of his Miranda rights by placing a "Jerome County 
sheriffs Officer Miranda Waiver" form containing those rights in front of Jensen and reading 
each right to him. Following each right Deputy Thorpe asked if Jensen understood that right and 
whether he had any questions. He then had Jensen initial next to the right just discussed 
indicating that he understood that right. The form also contains a Miranda Waiver which Jensen 
read and thereafter initialed. 
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After advising Jensen of his Miranda rights, the only question which the defendant posed 
was what his custody status was likely to be in the future. Deputy Thorpe informed Jensen that it 
primarily depended upon him whether he was returned to the custody of one of his parents, put in 
a foster home, or remained in State's custody. At no time during the Miranda advisements, 
waiver, or subsequent interview did Deputy Thorpe inform Jensen that he had right to have a 
parent present during questioning or that he did not have to speak to him in order to possibly be 
released back into the custody of one of his parents. Thereafter Deputy Thorpe conducted an 
interview and Jensen provided answers to some questions but remained non responsive to others. 
Deputy Thorpe also testified that he never informed Jensen's parents that he intended to 
interview him, nor could he remember if he had phone contact with Novak regarding the incident 
before or after he conducted the interview. 
EXHIBITS 
The following exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection: 
State's Exhibit No. I- Google earth photo of916 Bobcat Dr., Jerome, Idaho. 
State's Exhibit No. 2- Certified Records of JV 2014-135, including: 
Affidavit in support of Juvenile Petition filed 9/11/2014; 
Juvenile Rights From dated 9/11/2014 
Disposition under the Juvenile Corrections Act entered I 0/2/2014. 
State's Exhibit No. 3- Audio recording of Deputy Thorpe's interview of Daniel Jensen on 
December I, 2014. 
State's Exhibit No. 4- Jerome County Sheriffs Office Miranda Waiver initialed by 
Daniel Jensen 
III. 
MIRANDA ST AND ARD 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. 
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LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Veldez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993 (1995)). 
The requirement of an advisement of ones' Miranda rights is only required for custodial 
interrogations. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966), the United States Supreme Court 
held that statements by defendants "in custody" or when their freedom of action "is curtailed to a 
degree associated with formal arrest" are not admissible and will be suppressed unless police 
have first advised the defendant of his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before 
undertaking a custodial interrogation. See also State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591 (Ct. App. 
1999). "The determination of whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed 
question of law and fact." State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 369, 986 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The requirement of Miranda warnings only applies to "custodial interrogations" and it is the 
burden of the defendant to establish that he was in custody. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 
225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (20 I 0). In determining whether a suspect is in custody, an objective test is 
applied. The relevant inquiry is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have 
understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarly, 468 U.S. 420,442 (1984); Stale v. Silva, 134 
Idaho 848,854 (Ct. App. 2000); see also, Slate v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519,523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 
(2002). The custody test "is not based upon the subjective impressions in the minds of either the 
defendant or the law enforcement officer." Stale v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting State v. Massee, 132 Idaho 163, 165 (Ct. App. 1998)). The totality of the circumstances 
must be examined, which may include the location of the interrogation, the conduct of the 
officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, the time of the interrogation, and other 
persons present. Slate v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595,887 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App. 1994); Stale v. Medrano, 
123 Idaho 114, 117-18, (Ct. App. 1992). 
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Under those circumstances where Miranda warnings are required and where the 
defendant is interviewed by law enforcement after being advised of his Miranda rights, the State 
has the burden of proof on whether an individual made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver of his or her Miranda rights and must prove such a waiver by a preponderance of the 
evidence. State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2000). The Court 
must look to the "totality of the circumstances" and in doing so the factors that must be 
considered to determine if statements to law enforcement are voluntary consist of (I) whether 
Miranda warnings were given; (2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused's level of education 
or low intelligence; (4) the length of detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged nature of the 
questioning; and (6) the deprivation of food or sleep. Doe, 137 ldaho at 523, 50 P.3d at 1018. 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Questioning by Sgt. West on November 28, 2014 
On November 28, 2014 Sgt. Matthew West and Deputy Chad Kingsland arrived at the 
Novak residence to investigate the report the Jensen had attempted to poison his mother. When 
Deputies arrived the defendant and his friend Dumitry were seated on the front porch of the 
residence and Novak was in the doorway of the residence. Sgt. West began to ask questions and 
the defendant and Novak began to argue. Deputy Kingsland went into the residence with Novak 
and Sgt. West remained on the porch with Jensen and Dumitry. Sgt. West asked Jensen about 
putting rat poison in some coffee; if he drank the coffee; and if he was attempting to cause harm. 
He spent approximately l O to 12 minutes on the porch conversing with Jensen, with Dumitry 
present. While they were talking Jensen was standing on the porch within 4-5 feet of Sgt. West. 
Sgt. West was aware that Jensen was 17 years of age. Sgt. West described the conversation as 
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being of a "causal nature" and it was not heated or disrespectful. Further, the defendant did not 
appear to be nervous. Jensen made no attempt to leave or end the encounter, although Sgt. West 
admitted that had Jensen attempted to leave the area he would have been detained. However, the 
defendant was never told he had to stay or that he was not free to leave. The Court of Appeals in 
Slale v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32, 304 P.3d 304, 307 (Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations omitted) 
stated: 
A court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This generally involves a consideration of whether the circumstances surrounding the interrogation have created a "police-dominated atmosphere," and whether the 
circumstances involve the type of "'inherently compelling pressures' that are 
often present when a suspect is yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside 
world and subjected to interrogation in a police station." Specific factors to be 
considered may include the degree of restraint on the person's freedom of 
movement including whether the person is placed in handcuffs, whether the 
subject is informed that the detention is more than temporary, the location and 
visibility of the interrogation, whether other persons were present, the number of 
questions asked, the duration of the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of officers present, the number of officers involved in 
the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. 
At the time of the encounter with Sgt. West, Jensen was on the front porch of his 
residence and got out of his chair to speak with Sgt. West; Sgt. West did not require he remain 
seated. Also during this encounter Jensen was with his friend Caleb Dumitry, who was standing 
alongside him. By all accounts the conversation was calm and casual and Jensen was in a 
familiar environment. Jensen was not in any way physically restrained nor did Sgt. West say or 
do anything that would have suggested he was not free to leave. This conversation only lasted 
approximately IO minutes and was of a short duration. While two officers arrived at the 
residence, they parked on the street without the use of their overheads, and it appears that only 
one officer was actually present during the questioning of Jensen, since Kingsland had gone into 
the residence with Jensen's mother. 
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By all accounts Jensen was not in custody for purposes of Miranda while he was being 
questioned by Sgt. West. Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress his statements to Sgt. 
West is DENIED. 
B. December 1, 2014 Interview. 
On December I, 2014 there is no dispute that Jensen was in custody and that he was 
housed at the SRDC. Jensen was interviewed by Deputy Kirk Thorpe and the interview was 
recorded. (State's Exhibit No. 3). Deputy Thorpe began the interview by advising Jensen of his 
Miranda rights. Thorpe asked Jensen if he understood what he was charged with and Jensen 
indicated a battery charge. 1 Thorpe was aware that the defendant was 17 years of age. Thorpe 
asked the defendant as to whether he was able to read and write and whether he sufficiently 
understood the English language which Jensen answered in the affirmative. Thorpe then 
presented Jensen with a Miranda Rights Form and went over each of Jensen's rights to make 
sure Jensen understood his rights. (State's Exhibit No. 4). The evidence also shows that Jensen 
had some prior experience with law enforcement and his rights in juvenile cases, although it is 
not clear that he was previously familiar with his Miranda Rights. (State's Exhibit No. 2). 
Thorpe stressed with the defendant that if he had any questions about his rights that he could ask 
him and Thorpe would further explain his rights. Jensen indicated that he understood his rights 
and further indicated that he was willing to talk without an attorney. Jensen then initialed each of 
the Miranda rights and signed the Miranda Rights Form and agreed to speak with Deputy 
Thorpe. 2 The defendant's parents (as a juvenile's parents) were not present to the interview nor 
was Jensen advised that they could be present. Deputy Thorpe testified that the interview lasted 
1 At the time of this interview he had been charged in a Juvenile Petition and one of the charges was Aggravated 
Battery. 
2 The only question that Jensen had was what would happen to him after his court hearing and Thorpe indicated 
various things that could happen concerning placement but also indicated he did not know what would happen after 
his court appearance. Jensen had no questions concerning his rights. 
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approximately one (I) hour. According to Deputy Thorpe, the defendant remained calm though 
out the advisement of his rights and the interview. 
Jensen signed the Miranda Rights form wherein he waived his right to remain silent and 
agreed to speak with Deputy Thorpe. (State's Exhibit No. 3). The written Miranda waiver is 
"strong proof of a voluntary waiver" but the State still has the burden to prove a "knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary" waiver of Miranda. Doe, 137 Idaho at 523, 50 P.3d at 1018. 
To determine whether a juvenile has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, a 
court must consider 'the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and 
intelligence,' and 'whether he had the capacity to understand the warnings given 
him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving 
those rights.'" 
Id., 50 P.3d at 1018 (internal citations omitted). 
It is true that the defendant's parents were not present at the time of this interview and 
while there is no constitutional right to have a parent present, it is perhaps a factor to be 
considered in the totality of the circumstances; however, the failure of a parent to be present for 
the interview does not by itself render the waiver invalid. In State v. Doe, the juvenile's parents 
were not present for the interview. Id. at 521, 50 P.3d 1016. 
The interview occurred at approximately 9:30 a.m. on December l, 2014. Deputy Thorpe 
indicates to the defendant that he got arrested "this weekend" and asked Jensen if he understood 
his charge, to which he responded "battery." Deputy Thorpe then asked Jensen if he is familiar 
with Miranda rights. He asked Jensen if he has ever seen any shows on television where 
individuals were advised of their right to remain silent. To which Jensen responded "yeah." 
Thorpe then tells Jensen that he needs to go over the defendant's Miranda rights because before 
he can speak to him, he must understand his rights. Jensen understood that Thorpe was a law 
enforcement officer. He told Jensen that by initialing the various rights he was not confessing but 
was only saying that he understood his rights and if he did not understand he would further 
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explain his rights. lie then asked Jensen if he reads, writes, and understands the English 
language. Jensen indicated that he did understand. It is clear from the audio recording that Jensen 
understood his rights; that the conversation between Thorpe and Jensen was calm and not 
adversarial and there is no evidence to suggest that Jensen was deprived or sleep or food. It is 
also clear that he appeared alert. t111,krslood what wns happening. and that he was aware that he 
did not have to speak with law enrorccmcnl unless he wanted lo. Thorpe did nol down play the 
impo11ancc or the Miranda rights and in fact made it clear that he could not speak to Jensen 
unless Jensen understood his rights and was willing to speak or the events. There is no evidence 
that the defendant's free will was overborne by Deputy Thorpe. 
The evidence presented by the State clearly indicates that the dcf'cndant understood his 
Miranda rights and that he made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Miranda 
rights when he agreed to speak with Deputy Thorpe. Therefore, the motion to suppress the 
defendant's statements in the December I, 2015 interview is DENIED. 
V. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the de Cendant 's motion lo suppress his stale men ls on 
November 28. 2014 and December I. 2014 is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this _J ___ day of~{~\..[__, 2015 
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